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"When I saw, that anger and violence prevailed every day more and more, and that things were hastening towards an incurable alienation of our colonies, I felt this as one of those few moments in which decorum yields to a higher duty. Public calamity is a mighty leveler; and there are occasions when any, even the slightest, chance of doing good, must be laid hold on, even by the most inconsiderable person."—BURKE'S Speech in the House of Commons, March 22, 1775.

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TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS KINGDOM, AND
ESPECIALLY TO THE MEMBERS OF BOTH
HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,

Are submitted the following observations on the distresses and disputes which have arisen, and on the consequences which it is to be feared may ultimately arise, from the laws and regulations which have, of late years, been adopted with respect to our West India Colonies and Colonists in general, and particularly those of

THE ISLAND OF JAMAICA.

To nations as well as to individuals it frequently happens, when threatened with great and immediate dangers, to overlook, and of course to neglect to provide against, others not so near at hand and of slower approach, but, perhaps, not of less magnitude, and much more certain as to their arrival. Of the truth of this remark the present state of this kingdom and the conduct of its government furnish unquestionable proof. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," appears always to have been the maxim of Mr. Addington as well as of the minister whom he succeeded, and who has now again succeeded him. But, as the acting upon this maxim is utterly incompatible with any attempt at *prevention*, we have troubles and dangers of great magnitude constantly falling in upon us, like unexpected demands upon an improvident and embarrassed man in trade. Hence it is that the far greater part of our public measures consists of *remedies*, or attempts to remedy: they are generally brought forward upon the spur of the occasion: many of them obtain the sanction of Parliament upon no other ground than that of necessity; and we often hear the persons by whom measures are brought forward tell the House, that it is *too late* to talk about the cause from which such necessity has arisen. How often this has been, and is likely to be, the case need not be pointed out to those who have paid the least attention to the acts that have been passed, relative to almost every branch of our public affairs, within

the last twenty years. One measure of necessity hastily conceived and proposed, and not less hastily adopted, creates another and another and another measure of necessity of false and of temporary, of accidental, and, sometimes, of fatal effect. Thus we live along by shifts and expedients; always in a state of uncertainty if not of danger; gradually wearing away the resources of the country, the confidence of the people and of foreign nations, and the very foundations of the monarchy.

These reflections apply with peculiar justice to the conduct of government with regard to our West India Colonies and Colonists in general, and particularly those of Jamaica, where the planters, in consequence of a series of harsh, or at least, unadvised, measures, especially measures of taxation, have, at last, been reduced to a situation, which, if it has not impaired those sentiments of attachment to the mother country, hitherto so conspicuous in all their actions, does certainly threaten to produce that effect. With a sincere and most anxious desire to contribute towards the preventing of the evils which would but too surely result from such a cause, I have, after long waiting in hopes of seeing the subject in abler hands, ventured to take up the pen, first dismissing from my mind, as the reader certainly will from his, every consideration of a private or party complexion.

In order to come at a full and fair view of the merits of the case, it will be necessary to go back to the origin of the present complaints. We shall, indeed, trace every fibre back to that "root of all evil," *money*: the want of money, on the part of the minister, and the unwillingness or inability (generally the latter) to pay, on the part of the colonists: this is, in fact, now, as it was in the former fatal quarrel between Great Britain and her colonies, the chief and the only source of disagreement; for, though the providing of a maintenance for the troops necessary to the defence of the Island appears, for a long time, to have been the main subject of contention; yet it will, at

last, become evident, that the extortion of money on the one side, and the preventing of such extortion on the other, has constituted and does still constitute the struggle between his Majesty's ministers and the legislature and people of Jamaica.

The colonists of this Island have ever asserted their unqualified right to protection, internal as well as external, in common with the rest of his Majesty's subjects; and, without entering here into the arguments that have been used upon this point, we may ask, why those colonists should not have a right to such protection, as well as the colonists of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Canada? Till this question be answered by the producing of some special provision or agreement, making an exception with respect to Jamaica, the right asserted by that island must be admitted. And, indeed, though the planters in Jamaica, like the citizens of Dublin, have, from the first establishment of a military force amongst them, provided, by their colonial grants, an island-subsistence for the King's troops, in addition to their pay, yet such island-subsistence never ought to have been considered in any other light than that of a free donation, which the colonial legislature was, at any time, at perfect liberty to withhold, or to discontinue altogether. About thirty years ago the Council and assembly, in a joint address to the King, pledged themselves to continue this allowance to any number of men that might be sent to them, not exceeding 3000, and to provide for such men barracks, hospitals, and other conveniencies; all which the colony has most punctually and liberally performed, and, the Assembly has even made recently an addition to the former allowances. When the troubles in Saint Domingo first began to wear a serious and menacing aspect; application was made for an augmentation of the military force. The 20th dragoons and three regiments of foot were sent them, but accompanied with the condition that the island should defray all the additional expense which should, by a consent to this request, be made to the peace establishment of the kingdom. That it was not very generous, to say nothing about justice, thus to take advantage of the dangers and apprehensions of the colonists, no man will, I think, deny; especially when he considers, that the application was made at a time when the mother country was in the full enjoyment of all the advantages of peace and of uncommon prosperity, to which latter the colony of Jamaica largely contributed. The principle, too, upon which

these niggardly conditions were founded, was perfectly novel. Jamaica was to defray the expense of this additional military force, because it was demanded *in time of peace!* Because that part of the empire was, from its local situation, placed in a state resembling that of war, it was not to receive aid from the mother country, as a colony, as a part of the empire, but as a foreign country, to whom Great-Britain might, while she remained at peace herself, think it politic to *hire* troops! Nevertheless, so great and imminent were the dangers, to which the colony was exposed, that the House of Assembly yielded to the conditions; but, as they themselves declared at the time, this whole measure was to be considered merely as an experiment resorted in a moment of danger and for a *temporary* purpose; and, while they expressly stated, that the augmentation of the troops at their expense was not to be considered as a permanent establishment, they strongly remonstrated against the principle upon which the ministers had made the exaction, still asserting, in an address to his Majesty, their title to equal protection with the rest of his subjects.

In the year 1797 a further augmentation to the force in Jamaica became necessary. The mother country was now *at war*: the ground on which the former demand had been made upon the particular purse of the colony was, of course, removed: it could not again be proposed to send the British troops as *mercenaries*; and yet it was very desirable to make the colony pay the whole expense of this further augmentation of force, employed for *its* defence, certainly, but not more for its defence than for the defence of the navigation, manufactures, and revenue of Great-Britain. To get over this difficulty; to save a few thousand pounds here, in order to add them to the millions that were expending in sieges and battles for colonies which, if taken, were to be basely surrendered without an equivalent, an expedient was resorted to that reflects very little honour either on the head or the heart of the persons by whom it was conceived. The people of Jamaica were informed, that regiments of black slaves would be raised in, or sent to, the island. More alarmed at this *threat* (for it could be considered as nothing else) than at all the other dangers by which they were menaced; foreseeing the ruinous and horrible consequences that must ensue from the eradicating of those opinions and the subverting of that local policy, on which the authority of the white inhabitants was founded, and had always been supported

much more than by superior physical force, the Assembly submitted, as to an imperious necessity, to a deviation from the constitutional principle which they had constantly asserted, and they proposed, as a substitute for these armed slaves, to give out of the purse of the colony British pay to 2,000 European troops. But this arrangement included a plan for augmenting the white population of the island, and "for compensating," to use the words of the Assembly, "the immediate expenditure, by adding to the future security of the country." And, it must not be forgotten, that, even with this prospect before them, the consent of the Assembly was not given, until representations and remonstrances against the obtrusion of the blacks had been tried in vain, and until they obtained a positive promise, that no black military establishment should be raised in, or sent to, the island. Notwithstanding this promise, however, the project of sending black troops to Jamaica was resumed previous to the resignation of Mr. Pitt, and, agreeably to a letter, written by Mr. Dundas to the colonial agent declaring in the strongest terms the resolution of government to persevere in its intention, the 2d West-India regiment was actually landed in Jamaica previous to the peace, in direct violation of the condition entered into by the ministers themselves.

The preliminaries of *peace* were communicated to the people of Jamaica in company with a requisition from the mother country, that they would take upon them the whole expense of maintaining 5,000 European troops! The Assembly was told by the Governor, that the black regiment should immediately be removed out of the island, and that, in future, no corps of that description should be sent thither, without the concurrence of the House; that the colonists should be relieved from the expense of maintaining the 20th regiment of dragoons as a permanent establishment; that the proposed establishment of 5,000 men would probably be reduced at a future period by the restoration of good order, and subordination in the French islands. And that, seeing that the Assembly had, on a former occasion, pledged itself to pay 2,000 white troops, the present proposition could not be regarded as unreasonable. He reminded them, at the same time, of the advantages which the colony would derive from the establishment of barracks in the interior parts of it; nor did he forget the "great prospect of a much more ready and extensive sale for the produce of the colony, from new markets being opened to its

"commerce by the blessings of peace."

In answer to the message containing these requests and suggestions the Assembly re-asserted their unqualified right to protection as British subjects: they refused to give British pay to any troops at all, and expressed their astonishment that an attempt should have been made to load them with the whole expense of an establishment of 5,000 regulars, in addition to that of their expensive colonial militia: they concluded their answer by stating, that, notwithstanding the distresses of the planters, and the difficulty of supporting any additional burdens however light, they would consent, in case an augmentation, raising the establishment to 5,000, was made, to provide for the whole 5,000 that sort of subsistence and accommodation which they were already pledged to provide for 3,000 men. In consequence of this refusal the regiment of slaves, for the embarkation of which the Governor informed the Assembly he *had given directions*, was retained in the island, while the 20th regiment of dragoons were soon after removed from it.

An account of these transactions having been communicated by the Governor to Mr. Addington and his colleagues, they seem to have sought, with great care and assiduity, for precedents amongst those official proceedings by which the continent of North America was lopped off from the empire of that sovereign, of whom it was their constant boast, that they were the "*confidential*" servants." The letter of Lord Hobart, which appears to be the result of such an inquiry, and which was written in September, 1802, was not communicated to the House of Assembly till the month of November last, and it is sincerely to be wished that the nation may not have to mourn over the circumstance of its ever having been communicated at all. His Lordship sets out, as was the uniform practice with those sages who managed the affairs of the American colonies, just before they ceased to own allegiance to Great Britain, that is, with expressing his Majesty's *approbation of the zeal of the Governor*, an expression by no means called for, especially as the paper communicated to the Assembly purports to be "*an extract of a letter from Lord Hobart.*" To approve of one party in a dispute is to disapprove of the other party; therefore it was, in this case, not only unnecessary, but mischievous, to express the King's approbation of the conduct of the governor. After using a little slippancy upon the subject of the "*utterly untenable*" ground taken by the Assembly, and expres-

sing, with a sort of sneer, "a confident hope" that their time will be more taken up with devising the means of providing the supply than with endeavouring to find arguments to justify their want of liberality; after this extract proceeds to produce, as grounds of the present application, the bargain that was driven by the government in 1791, which bargain, as was before observed, was totally destitute not only of generosity but of justice also. It next refers to the bargain of 1797, and, upon the subject of the subsequent employment of slave regiments in Jamaica, it denies that the government violated its engagement, because the ministers, in sending those armed slaves, did not insist upon the colony's continuing to pay the 2,000 European troops! The words of the letter are these: "The measure was adopted under an express declaration on the part of his Majesty's ministers that they considered the Assembly as no longer bound to their engagement for the pay of the two thousand men, and from that period the provision for this service has been made from Great Britain, thereby dissolving the compact that had been entered into, and not violating it, as has been inadvertently stated by the Assembly." The Assembly, in answer to this part of the letter, so insulting to common sense, observe, that, "from an anxious disposition to cultivate harmony with the parent state, the House forbear to comment on the doctrine of dissolving a compact at the pleasure of one of the contracting parties, although destructive of all public confidence, and most alarming to the weaker side." This certainly is a doctrine that was never before heard of in the world; and who would not accuse the Assembly of a want of fidelity to their trust, if they were again to vote away the money of their constituents upon the faith of a similar compact entered into with the same party? The Assembly did not agree to pay the 2,000 European troops, upon condition that no slave regiments should be raised in, or sent to their colony, only while they continued to pay those troops; but upon condition that their alarm, on this account, should be entirely removed, that is, upon condition that, at no future time, slave regiments should be sent amongst them. They very well knew, they must have known, that a time was likely to arrive, when the 2,000 men, in addition to the former establishment and the militia, would not be wanted in Jamaica; when no longer wanted, they would, of course, be no longer continued; but, can it be supposed, that, if they ceased from this cause to pay

the 2,000 men, they expected, after the above-mentioned compact, to be liable to receive slave regiments into their colony? No: the sending of the slave regiment to Jamaica was a breach of public faith which nothing can palliate, and it requires no small share of self-confidence in the ministry to expect that it will speedily be forgotten. The governor assured the Assembly, in his message of June, 1802, that the black regiment "should be immediately removed," and announced to them "the consent of his Majesty to the wishes of the Assembly, that, in future, no corps of that description should be sent thither, without the concurrence of the House." Lord Hobart, in case the Assembly consent to the proposition of maintaining the European troops, repeats this assurance; but, what reliance can the Assembly place on such promises, especially when they come through ministers who hold the doctrine, that a compact may be "dissolved" at pleasure by the will of one of the contracting parties? Now, indeed, the Assembly will find a change in the ministry; but, whether their confidence is likely to be much increased thereby, is a question that will require but little consideration amongst those who recollect who it was that violated the former compact. In coming to the remaining parts of the letter of Lord Hobart, we find its tone begin to soften. The ministers sink in their demands; and the governor is directed to apply to the Assembly for pay and subsistence for three thousand men instead of five thousand men. It is added, too, that it is not intended to limit the military defence of the Island to this force; but the governor is "to express his Majesty's pleasure, that, upon a full consideration of all circumstances, the Island shall not be called upon for a larger contribution than that which has been stated." It was a maxim with a very cunning and famous man of the other side of the Atlantic, never to give a reason for any thing that he said or did. Well would it have been for Lord Hobart and his colleagues, if they had heard of and steadily pursued the advice of this cautious philosopher! The governor, in his message to the Assembly in June, 1802, states the great probability of the 5,000 being reduced in number, at a future period, by the restoration of good order and subordination in the French islands: then in the month of September following comes his principal, my Lord Hobart, and states to this same Assembly, that the numbers are already reduced from five to three thousand men; because—what, do you think? Because, "the French army in Saint Domingo has

"been greatly reduced," and because "the French naval force has returned from that station to Europe"!!! On the 17th of June the governor told the Assembly, that the restoration of order in the French islands would enable him to make a reduction in the number of their troops; on the 6th of the next September, Lord Hobart, with the governor's message upon the table before him, sets down and tells them, that the number of troops wanted has been reduced from five thousand to three thousand by circumstances which render it utterly improbable, and almost impossible, that the *hoped for* restoration of order should take place for several years to come! Does any man believe that the Assembly did not see through and despise this paltry device? That they did not clearly perceive it to have been invented by the ministry as an excuse for sinking in their demands, without an appearance of yielding to the Assembly? And, did Mr. Addington and Lord Hobart imagine, that the members of the Assembly of Jamaica had not pride as well as they? Did they think, that, by reducing the demand to three-fifths of its original amount, they should induce those members to abandon the great principle, for which they and their predecessors had so long contended? Did they in good truth believe that those members consisted in great part of "live stock?" It would appear so, and that they did not regard them as the best kind even of such stock; for, after having endeavoured to wheedle them with this reduction in the amount of the demand, the letter concludes with expressing a full persuasion that the concurrence of the Assembly will be obtained to the extent now proposed, in which case, their wishes respecting the black slave regiment are to be acceded to; "but," says Lord Hobart to the Governor, "if, contrary to the reasonable expectations of his Majesty's government, the Assembly should not concur even to that extent, *the intention of removing the black troops must be laid aside!*" Upon this part of the letter the Assembly express themselves with becoming indignation: "The House lament," say they, "that their duty compels them to express their surprise and concern, that his Majesty's present ministers, whose moderation and respect for the constitution have been the subject of deserved eulogy, should direct to be submitted to the loyal inhabitants of this island, a proposition of the highest importance to their constituents and their posterity, not to be discussed on its own merits, not to be rejected or acceded to after

weighing its effects and consequences on our constitution, and in our actual situation, but accompanied by a threat, that, if the deliberate and unbiassed voice of this house declared it inadmissible, we must expect that a body of regimented slaves, introduced in opposition to the unanimous opinion of the inhabitants, and the collected voice of all who are interested in the welfare of this island, shall be continued in its bosom, the object of universal abhorrence; a singular monument of pertinacity in speculative opinions in opposition to practical and sober experience; a body, contemptible as the means of protection, formidable only in the danger of its example, and as an instance of an armed force kept up in the colony, after it has been declared dangerous and unconstitutional by the representatives of the people." To the distance at which the Assembly of Jamaica is, and to their consequent inability to detect the falsehoods of the *hired* eulogists of Mr. Addington's administration, must be attributed their opinion, that the eulogy which had been bestowed on it was "deserved;" for, whenever the acts of that administration shall undergo a full and impartial review (not written by a Doctor *half promised the next vacant bishoprick*), it will appear, that, during no administration that this country has known for at least a hundred years past, was there ever shown less real moderation, and certainly never less respect for the constitution. Of the truth of this, little, one would think, could be required to convince those to whom the above-mentioned letter of Lord Hobart had been communicated; for, assuredly, a communication more daringly disrespectful to every principle of the constitution of England could not possibly have been made. The use which both ministries seem to have intended the slave regiment for, is, not to contribute to the defence of Jamaica so much as to extort other means of defence from the purse of the colony: just as, in a conquered city, you send a company at free quarter into the house of him who refuses his contribution. With regard to Mr. Addington's ministry, there can be no doubt at all as to the motive, and very little, it is to be feared, as to that of their predecessors, who are now again their successors, those of them, indeed, who are not the same identical persons. If, however, Mr. Dundas's intention was not to extort a compromise, not to make the Assembly defray the expense of white troops far beyond the number of 2,000 men, but to compel the colony to submit to a permanent establishment of armed

slaves, what have the Assembly and their constituents *now* to expect?

Thus far we have heard of no complaints, of no subjects of dispute, except those relative to troops; and we see, that the object of government constantly has been to quash the claim to protection maintained by the Assembly, and to throw the whole burden of the military establishment of the island upon the island itself; treating it, as to matters of protection, like a foreign state, while as to matters of trade and commerce, it is held in the tightest bonds of allegiance, not to use the harsher term of subjection. It is by no means certain, that no part of the grievances of Jamaica have arisen from that haughtiness, self sufficiency, and impatience of contradiction, which, in many instances, have been but too visible in the conduct of those having the power to produce such grievances; but, an effect far too extensive has certainly been attributed to this cause, which, in my opinion must be considered almost as nothing, when compared to the *financial distresses* of the mother country. This is the primary cause of all the grounds of colonial complaint. The minister never knows which way to turn him for money: any measure is welcome whereby money is to be raised, or the payment of money is to be avoided; provided always, that the said measure is in no wise connected with political and especially party views. The mind not only of the minister, but of the whole ministry, and indeed of the whole country, is kept constantly upon the stretch after objects of taxation on the one hand, and after the means of reducing our expenses on the other. Nor is this at all to be wondered at, when such is the state of our affairs, that the duration of our existence, as an independent nation, is calculated not by days and months and years, but by hundreds and thousands and millions of pounds. Hence it is that colonies are now estimated solely as sources of revenue, and not at all as out-lets for our enterprizing population, as the places of strength, as out-works to the kingdom, and as nurseries for the navy.

The first thing the colonists of Jamaica heard of the mother country after the return of a peace, which was to give abundance and ease to all his Majesty's subjects, was, an additional demand upon their purse, additional taxes upon their already impoverished estates in the island, at the same time that additional duties were here imposed upon the produce of those estates. They were reminded, exactly as the people of America were, of the vast expenses which the mother country had been at during the long war that

had just terminated, and of the enormous load of debt that she had contracted. They answered, that they observed with regret, that whilst measures were adopted to relieve the inhabitants of the mother country from the pressure of the heaviest of their taxes (alluding to the income tax), his Majesty's loyal subjects of Jamaica, in place of participating in the general blessings of peace, were to be called on for augmented and unusual contributions, grievous in their amount and oppressive in their principle. They objected to the principle; they again asserted their unqualified right to equal protection; but, as to the burden it was now beyond their *ability* to bear it. In adverting to the arrangement respecting the payment of the 2,000 European troops, which arrangement was concluded in 1798, they stated that to have been a season of great prosperity, when all their staples were selling at a very high price, and when the Assembly might flatter themselves with being able to raise the necessary funds without inconvenience. But now, from causes chiefly arising from the fiscal laws and regulations of the mother country, the planters are in circumstances the very reverse of those which existed in 1791 and 1798, and are scarcely able to raise the taxes necessary for the common contingencies of their internal government, as evidently appears from the amount of their public debt, from the nature of the taxes they have had recourse to, as well as from the difficulty with which those taxes are collected, and from the great defalcations in the collections.

The origin of this distress is dated from the year 1799, when the minister conceived, and attempted to execute, the project of making the *foreign* consumer of West-India produce pay duties thereon into the Exchequer of Great-Britain. Previous to this most impolitic measure, West-India produce brought into British ports, whither, indeed, it was all obliged to be brought, was allowed to be exported to foreign countries, and, in case of such exportation, was allowed a drawback and bounty. By the new regulation these encouragements to exportation were withdrawn, upon the erroneous notion, that, as we had made a monopoly of West-India produce, and as foreigners would have the produce, they *must* have it from us, cost what it would, and that the amount of the former drawback and bounty would, at last, fall upon them. The error was not long in becoming apparent. A sudden stagnation of the trade ensued. The consumption and demand in Great-Britain bore no proportion to the quantity imported; and, the conse-

quent depression of the price threatened the planters with utter ruin. The measure was, indeed, soon abandoned; but short as was the time of its existence, its effects have been durable. The minister was right in supposing that foreigners would still have West-India produce, but he was egregiously deceived as to the concluding part of his proposition; for it required but a very little time to demonstrate, that they were not compelled to have it from us loaded with British duties. They received it through other channels; other colonies and other carriers obtained a preference, undersold us in all the markets of the Continent, and the effect of the diversion is severely felt to this day. The change which was expected, when the evil was admitted and the remedy applied, was slow and fluctuating: the Assembly state, in their last answer to the Governor, that their agriculture and commerce have never recovered from the shock; and they aver, "that in place of contributing only a *share* of the general expenses of the empire, in the proportion of their net revenue, the sugar planters of this island have, for the last four years, had nearly their whole income torn from them, by duties which cannot even be alleged to fall upon the consumer, when nothing is left to the grower for labour or capital."

As if, however, the West-India colonies and colonists were in too flourishing a state; as if there had been in the market an alarming scarcity of their produce; and as if we had entertained serious apprehensions that our mercantile marine and our seamen would become too numerous; as if evils and fears of this sort had assailed us, the minister eagerly adopted the suggestions of those speculative or interested persons, who recommended measures calculated to encourage the transfer of British capital for the cultivation of sugar in the East-Indies, thereby depriving, as far as in him lay, the West-India planters of all prospect of any favourable change; for supposing an addition to the quantity of produce to have been wanted, he left them no fair competition with the East-India planters, who are free from almost all the numerous shackles by which the operations of the West-Indian are checked, and particularly from the compulsory and inflexible regulation as to the destination of his produce, the planters in the East-Indies being at perfect liberty to ship theirs to any market in the world, and that, too, in the vessels of any nation.

In the mean-time the British duties upon West-India produce, speaking particularly of the two principal articles *sugar* and *rum*,

have grown to such a magnitude, have been in some respects so injudiciously imposed, at the same time that the commodities have been so cruelly deprived of the preference and protection which the law formerly afforded them in the markets of the mother country, that the planters are threatened with nothing short of absolute ruin. The answer given, in Parliament, by Mr. Addington, to those who remonstrated against these erroneous duties, was, that all duties finally fell upon the consumer. Where duties amount to a prohibition, they certainly do not thus fall: they are, in that case, never collected, and they evidently injure the grower without benefiting any body. Where the duties do not amount to a prohibition, but diminish the consumption, they injure the grower in proportion to the quantity of the diminution. That a very considerable diminution in the consumption, both foreign and domestic, has taken place, in the articles of West-India produce, is clearly established by facts; but, such facts are not necessary to prove, that the present duties are of a ruinous tendency to the planter, who may be completely beggared by them, without their producing any diminution whatever in the quantity of produce consumed, and though the full amount of them should finally fall upon the consumer, as will evidently appear from facts which will hereafter be stated, and which cannot be denied.

But, previous to the making this statement, it is necessary to hear that of the planters themselves. Before the year 1803, the duty upon West-India sugar was 20s. per cwt. In that year Mr. Addington laid on an additional duty of 4s. per cwt. with a proportionate addition to the duty upon rum. On that occasion there was a meeting of the West-India planters and merchants, held on the 24th of June, 1803, at which meeting the following resolutions were agreed to, and were afterwards printed and circulated.

"I. That experience has proved that a duty of 20s. per cwt. upon all British plantation sugar, however productive and enduring under the circumstances of high prices, adequate drawbacks and bounties, and an uninterrupted communication with the continental markets, is yet, under a glutted market and an impeded access to the Continent, greatly disproportionate to the price of that article, falling, in such times, with its enormous weight, entirely upon the growers, who are utterly unable to bear it.—II. That under the present prospect of an impeded intercourse with the European markets, an addition of 4s.

“ per cwt. to the disproportionate tax of
 “ 20s. per cwt. already laid upon sugar,
 “ must be productive to the revenue only in
 “ that degree in which it may add to the
 “ burthen, already too heavy, upon the
 “ planter; but is moreover likely to defeat,
 “ in many instances, its own purpose, by
 “ causing an absolute abandonment of the
 “ article, which at great expense and labour
 “ has been produced, rather than incur the
 “ additional expenses of freight, duty, and
 “ charges, upon it.—III. That this must
 “ more particularly apply to the lower qua-
 “ lities of sugar, the inevitable production of
 “ certain soils, the nature of which cannot
 “ be changed by the labour and skill of the
 “ cultivator, and which, consistently with
 “ the colonial system of Great Britain, must
 “ be shipped to Europe, from the planta-
 “ tions, without being refined, but which
 “ are almost wholly dependent for con-
 “ sumption upon foreign markets, by re-
 “ shipment from hence either in their raw
 “ or refined state.—That a tax of 24s. per
 “ cwt. upon sugar of this description (un-
 “ accompanied with a free access to the
 “ Continent for the vent both of raw and
 “ refined sugar) is, in the strictest sense of
 “ the word, a prohibition of the import of
 “ that which forms the staple article of a
 “ great part of the British West India co-
 “ lonies.—IV. That, on this ground, it hav-
 “ ing been recommended to his Majesty’s
 “ ministers to levy any additional tax upon
 “ an *ad valorem* principle, as applied to the
 “ respective qualities of sugar, since its
 “ burthen might so fall the less heavy upon
 “ that description of the article which is al-
 “ ready suffering by the mode of levying
 “ the existing duty, this meeting is con-
 “ cerned to find that *official obstacles*, (the
 “ validity of which has not been demon-
 “ strated, and the reasonable foundation for
 “ which may be doubted since the mode of
 “ sampling and selling sugars at the out-
 “ ports has been also adopted at the port of
 “ London.) have been considered by his
 “ Majesty’s ministers as sufficient to prevent
 “ the adoption, in this particular instance,
 “ of a principle, the justice of which they
 “ have never questioned.—V. That, not-
 “ withstanding this meeting has, on various
 “ occasions, and after deliberate discussion
 “ of the subject, expressed in decided terms
 “ the sense they entertained of the unjusti-
 “ fiable mode of levying large, and con-
 “ tinually increasing, duties on sugar in ra-
 “ tio of its quantity, and without regard to
 “ its quality or price, they feel themselves
 “ now called upon to repeat and to confirm
 “ their former resolutions on this subject,

“ and to render public their opinion, that
 “ the application of a heavy tax to the
 “ weight and quantity of an article widely
 “ differing in quality and price, (though of
 “ the same general denomination,) is unjust
 “ and destructive of that equality which is
 “ an essential principle in all taxation.—
 “ VI. That the proposed increase of duty of
 “ 12½ per cent. on the customs, and 50 per
 “ cent. upon the excise, on another staple
 “ commodity of the West-India colonies,
 “ rum, adds, at this crisis, to the alarm of
 “ those who depend for their whole support
 “ upon returns from the British colonies;
 “ and, will, most likely, prove eventually as
 “ destructive of its object, and as detrimen-
 “ tal to the revenue, as it has, in the first
 “ instance, turned out to be oppressive on
 “ the price, and injurious to the regular de-
 “ mand for that article.—VII. That the
 “ proprietors of estates in the West-India
 “ colonies, whose attachment to the mother-
 “ country and to his Majesty’s person and
 “ government, has been, upon many oc-
 “ casions, zealously demonstrated; who are
 “ ever ready to contribute their fair pro-
 “ portion to the exigencies of government,
 “ and who feel particularly the propriety of
 “ doing so at this crisis; *have actually cul-*
 “ *tivated their estates to a loss, for several*
 “ *years past*, owing to the pressure of those
 “ taxes which have been levied on their
 “ produce, and to the great additional ex-
 “ pense they have sustained in every article
 “ needful for their use and sustenance,
 “ which they have been obliged to purchase
 “ from this country:—VIII. That, under
 “ these circumstances, the West-India plan-
 “ ters and merchants will feel themselves
 “ compelled to submit to the British Par-
 “ liament their whole case; trusting that
 “ the Legislature will not treat with indif-
 “ ference the certain prospect of the decay
 “ of those possessions which, from their in-
 “ sular situation, are most securely attached
 “ to the fortunes of this country, which
 “ take from her all they consume, and re-
 “ turn all their acquisitions into her bosom,
 “ and to which Britain more peculiarly owes
 “ her maritime pre-eminence, the safeguard
 “ of all her wealth, power, and independ-
 “ dence.”

The statements in these resolutions are far from being exaggerated. They are a fair representation of the state of the West-India planters at the time when the 4s. additional duty on sugar, indiscriminately, was imposed. By referring to the Register, Vol. V. p. 539, the reader will find a very able arithmetical statement proving, beyond all contradiction, that the complaints of the

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Assembly of Jamaica and of the planters in London are well founded, as far, at least, as those complaints relate to the amount and effect of duties. Nevertheless, when new taxes came to be imposed again *this* year, sugar and rum seem to have been the first objects that presented themselves to the minister. The representations of the planters, and, which was more, their evident decay, had produced no effect. He again told the Parliament, that the addition now proposed would *fall upon the consumer*, and that, too, at the very moment when his partisans were eulogizing him for "his tenderness towards *the people* in the selection of his new taxes," which, they added, would "fall almost exclusively upon the rich." When these further additional duties were proposed, a committee of West-India planters and merchants drew up and printed the following resolutions, dated May 3, 1804. In presenting documents of this sort to the public, I am aware that it will be said of them, that they are the representations of one party only, and that party deeply interested. But the same may be said of all petitions, remonstrances, and of complaints whatever form they may assume. Though they do come from one party only, and a deeply interested party, we are bound to give credit to them, unless they are, after a reasonable time, contradicted by the other party. It will be said, perhaps, that the ministers have something else to do than to enter into a dispute with committees of West-India planters. They have, indeed, enough upon their hands; but, were it in their power to refute the statements of the West-India planters, they would certainly lose no time in doing it; for the complaints of these people are by no means to be stifled; they are steadily urging their way forward; and they *must*, at a time not very distant, come before the legislature, where, if some redress be not previously afforded, it will be impossible for the minister to justify his conduct. The resolutions above-mentioned were as follows: "I. That the proposed addition of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on customs generally, implying an addition of 3s. per cwt. to the already enormous duty of 24s. per cwt. upon sugar, and also increasing the duty on rum, which has already risen to a height that has very considerably impeded its sale, are calculated to fill with alarm those whose existence depends upon the producing of those articles.—II. That recent experience will sufficiently prove, that the usual provisions of drawbacks and bounties do not secure to the planters in the British colo-

nies a market for that part of their produce which is not consumed in Great-Britain and Ireland, which surplus produce they are compelled by law to send to Great-Britain and Ireland, and therefore they are not enabled to raise from the consumer the taxes which are from time to time imposed upon their produce.—III. That at the time when the heavy additional duties of last year were imposed upon sugar and rum, the current prices of those articles at the British market were far short of such as are barely sufficient to enable the British planters to meet the expenses, which in every point of their intercourse with the mother country have necessarily accumulated upon them, notwithstanding which the average prices of the past year, calculated on the quantities sold, instead of bearing some proportion to the new and considerable war charges which have recently occurred, have not even been increased in proportion to those taxes, which it is evident, therefore, have fallen on the shoulders of those who are already too heavily burthened, and not upon the consumer.—IV. That to increase this burthen at the present time, with no prospect that the result will turn out otherwise than it has done in the preceding year, is to impress upon the West-India planters a conviction that they are condemned to persist in a cultivation, which instead of affording a reasonable compensation for their labours entails on them from year to year a heavy additional loss.—V. That the accounts produced to Parliament plainly indicate that the British consumption of sugar has decreased rather than increased under the late prices of that article, which, although swelled by the amount of duties, freight, and charges, have still left to the growers of the produce an inadequate return. That to persist, therefore, in adding to that amount of charges by a new duty on that article, must eventually be found as unproductive in point of revenue, as it will be destructive of the capital embarked in the British colonies, and of the great advantages which in respect of commerce and navigation, they are calculated to confer upon the mother country.—VI. That the chairman do communicate these resolutions to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and request that a conference on the subject thereof, may be granted to a deputation from this committee previous to the taxes (so far as they are proposed to af-

fect the articles of sugar and rum,) being finally adopted."

That these resolutions were communicated to Mr. Addington there can be no doubt: what were the remarks, if any, made thereon by that statesman and financier educated in the profound school of Mr. Pitt, we have no means of ascertaining; but, one thing we know, and that is, that the representations of the planters had no practical effect, the proposed additional duty being immediately afterwards imposed; nor is it by any means improbable, that, in the next year's budget, *sugar and rum* may again make a conspicuous figure, Mr. Pitt having, since his return to power, sufficiently demonstrated his intention to persevere in his former measures, those measures from the adoption of which the West India planters date the commencement of their ruin. The language of exaggeration is but too often employed in the description of distress; but, that there is *much* truth in the description which the planters have given of their situation every one must believe. In the first place there is a sort of pride which prevents bodies of men as well as individuals from beginning to complain of their poverty. The planters of Jamaica have not uniformly complained of the duties laid upon their produce: when they do complain, therefore, and so grievously too, who can doubt that they severely feel the hardships of which they complain? Besides, the complaint comes not merely from a body of planters and merchants, but from the Legislative Assembly of the Island of Jamaica; and it is not for a moment to be supposed, that any representation, which was not substantially founded in fact, could issue from such a quarter. A very material circumstance, too, is, that no refutation has ever been attempted. The ministry at home, if they declined the task themselves, have pens enough at their command, and are usually sufficiently eager to employ them. The pen of that prince of tax-gatherers, Mr. Lowndes, who writes you a thick octavo volume by way of "exposition" to a single tax-bill, it might, indeed, not have been very wise to put in motion against the pithy productions of the West India complainants; but, there were pens in plenty of another description, and the not having employed any one of them upon the subject must be regarded as strong circumstantial proof that the statements of the planters were unanswerable. The governor of Jamaica was upon the spot: he had the materials for contradiction, if they existed at all, before his eyes: if we could, for a moment, believe it likely for the Assembly, in their answer to him, to make a

solemn appeal to the notoriety of distresses which did not exist, is it not utterly incredible that he, who was so zealous in the cause of the ministry, should have passed over that appeal in total silence? The pecuniary distresses of the colony, that is to say of the planters, arising in great part from the heavy duties imposed upon their produce, were, we must remember, urged as amongst the principal reasons for the Assembly's not yielding to the request of the ministry, made through the governor: and, if those pecuniary distresses had not been real and even visible and notorious; nay, had it not, moreover, been a well-known and an acknowledged fact, that they had arisen from the very causes assigned by the Assembly, can it possibly be imagined, that no reply whatever would have been made by the governor to those reasons? Governors of colonies are not, upon such occasions, much disposed, either by the nature of their offices or their future prospects, to desist from the adducing of any fact or argument that may favour the views of the ministry at home. They have always at their command the talents of lawyers generally animated by a spirit in perfect unison with their own. And, as in the case of diplomatic agents treating with an hostile, or, at least, rival power, their merit is usually measured by the concessions and advantages they succeed in obtaining. It is, therefore, I repeat it, utterly incredible, that the governor of Jamaica should not have attempted a refutation of the statements on which the complaints of the colonists were founded, if those statements had not been such as to have admitted of no refutation. But, indeed, reasoning upon this subject is rendered unnecessary by facts which are but too well known in this country, amongst all those who have any knowledge of the state of the West India trade. Reference has already been made to an authentic paper showing the amount of the losses now and of late years sustained by those whose produce consists of sugar: that those who are the owners of rum are in no better, but even in a much worse situation, will appear from a very concise description of the state of that other chief article of West India produce. The amount of the present duty upon rum per gallon is rather more than 12s. I will not speak to a penny, but I venture to state it at 12s. 4d. per gallon. This rum now sells, and has sold for some time back, at not more than 13s. 6d. and, upon an average, perhaps, at not more than 13s. The *difference*, then, is the whole value of the gallon of rum, after the duties upon it are paid! "Impossible!" exclaims

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the reader. That it is impossible for such a trade to continue, for any length of time, is certain enough; but, that such is the state of it now is not only possible, but strictly true. The rum sells, it is even now selling, in the port of London, and in several other ports, at the price above-mentioned. The planter who has it in the storehouses, where it lies as a pledge to the government for the payment of the duties, sells it for 6d. or at most 1s. 2d. per gallon, leaving the duties to be paid by the purchaser, who takes out the commodity and pays the duties as his occasions require. The planter has to pay upon every gallon of rum *after it leaves the still*, about 4s. under the heads of freight, insurance, and other charges attending the shipment and landing of the commodity. These four shillings are, observe, *exclusive of duties*; so that, supposing him, in every instance, to sell his rum at 1s. 2d. exclusive of duties, he sustains a loss upon each gallon of 2s. 10d. Is it not, then, with perfect truth, that the Assembly of Jamaica state, that they have "*nearly* their whole income" torn from them by duties which cannot "even be alleged to fall upon the consumer, "when nothing is left to the grower for labour or capital?" It is, when we add the duties that have been laid on since the Assembly made this statement, still worse than they described it, as far as relates to the article of rum. Not only has the planter nothing left for labour or capital; not only are his industry, his stock, and his estate rendered, by these enormous duties, totally useless to him: they are worse than useless: they occasion him an annual loss in direct proportion to the quantity of his produce: they make an annual addition to his debts, and cause an annual augmentation to the mortgage on his estate. And these are the people upon whom government are calling to double the amount of their colonial taxes! To take upon themselves the expense of defending their island, as if they and their estates contributed nothing to the general wealth and strength of the empire! "The consumer," says Messrs. Addington and Pitt, "the consumer pays all at last." This is not true even in their own sense of the words; for they make the planters pay duty upon a certain portion of their produce which is never reckoned to the buyer. But, as was before observed, though the consumer pays dear enough for West-India produce, a fact which no such consumer will deny; though the rum drinker pays from 2rs. to 25s. a gallon (it may be more for aught I know), before the liquor reaches his lips, he does not there-

by compensate the planter for his losses; he does not thereby prevent a diminution in the demand for the commodity. "The consumer pays all at last." Yes, all but the planter, between whom and the consumer the government has, by its merciless exactions, cut off all connexion, the former having sustained an irretrievable loss long before his produce gets into the hands of the latter.

The consequences of a perseverance in the indiscreet measures which have produced this state of things, which have given rise to these bitter complaints and recriminations, is a topic into which I should now enter somewhat at length, were I not, for want of room, compelled to confine myself to a few detached observations.

In the several occasions, when the governor has, of late years, made an application to the Assembly for an addition to their contribution towards the expenses of defending the island, and, having failed in his object, has, in no very indirect terms, reproached them with niggardliness, they have, in the course of their answer, complained of the injurious restrictions laid on their intercourse with the United States of America, whence only they say (and they say it truly) they can obtain a supply of several articles indispensably necessary to their very existence in the colony. Assuredly this restriction is to them a great disadvantage, merely as planters of Jamaica; but, there remains no doubt in my mind, that the navigation laws may be strictly adhered to, as to their spirit and utility, without leaving the Jamaica or other West India planters any ground of complaint. But then, the duties imposed upon their produce consumed in the mother-country must be lightened, and its channel to the markets of the continent must be rendered more free; for, to compel them to bring their produce here, to tax it when it comes here in such a way as to leave them nothing for their labour and use of their capital, and at the same time to oblige them to pay, not in produce, but *in specie*, for the necessities of life which they receive from America is, in fact, coolly and deliberately to pass on them a sentence of ruin; a sentence to which most assuredly no men will submit, if they can by any means come at the power of resistance. The West India planters, those of Jamaica I mean, have lived and flourished under the navigation laws, for nearly a century and a half, without ever, till of late years, making any thing like a serious complaint. But, they did not complain, because they flourished; and they flourished because their produce was not overloaded

with imposts; because the custom house of England did not add in any considerable degree, to the disadvantages arising from the laws of navigation; because the justice and the wisdom of the mother country taught her not to restrain her colonies by navigation laws with one hand in order to obtain from their trade sailors for her navy, while, as a mere object of revenue, she squeezed them, as it were in a wine press, with the other; because the statesmen of England had not yet conceived the brilliant idea of a public debt, the interest of which should absorb the total of the annual revenue, with a view of preserving the state by the baseness instead of the patriotism and loyalty of the people; and because this debt had not created a necessity for a system of taxation as universal in its touch as the air that we breathe. The planters of Jamaica have no enmity to the navigation laws; no desire to weaken the ties that have hitherto bound them, heart and hand, to the mother country; but, they cannot bear these duties and the navigation laws too. Their present state is not bearable; they must and will complain; and, if you reproach them with niggardliness, shall they not show the causes that disable them from acceding to your demands? I am not one of those who think that the West-India Islands are, for centuries to come, at least, if ever, destined to be colonies to North America, notwithstanding their dependence upon it for all the articles of first necessity. But, I do think that there is great danger of a total subversion of these colonies, succeeded by a sort of beggarly independence; the islands inhabited here by blacks and there by whites; having in one place a government of one sort, in another a government of another sort, and in another no government at all. This dreadful revolution, which we may be assured would be aided by France, by America, and which would be viewed with pleasure by most of the nations of Europe, would go very far indeed towards the destruction of the maritime force of Great-Britain; and, to produce such a revolution nothing would contribute more than the ruin of the planters of Jamaica. Men will not love those by whom they are ruined, nor will they die merely to remove the apprehensions of their oppressors. Some one tells a story of a French minister, who having reproached a lampoonist with his conduct, and having received for answer, "Eh, Monseigneur, il faut que je vive," replied, "ma foi je n'en vois pas la nécessité." This might be a very good answer from a French minister to a lampoonist, but for an

English minister to tell the planters of Jamaica, that, "if they cannot live by making sugar they may make something else," is not quite so good. They can make nothing else; they must live or starve by sugar-making, and as we may be certain that they will not starve if they can find the means of avoiding it, we should be very careful how we goad them on to the seeking of those means.

WM. COBBETT.

DODDRIDGE ON PARLIAMENTS.

SIR,—In consequence of a letter dated from Gray's Inn, and inserted in the last number of your Register, I have been induced to look into Mr. Justice Doddridge's Essay on Parliaments among Hearne's Discourses; and I shall be happy if I can throw any light on the subject of your correspondent's inquiries, certainly a point very interesting and important in the consideration of our mixed constitution.—It seems to me, that all the latter part of the paper, for nearly two pages preceding the signature is, in fact, a short abstract made with the usual care, perspicuity and judgment of Mr. Justice Doddridge, from a manuscript treatise very famous in that day, under the title of *Modus tenendi Parliamentum*. This little work had been first brought into notice about ten years before, by my Lord Coke, when he was Speaker of the House of Commons; and it was always believed by him really to have been of that high antiquity to which he supposed it to pretend; that is, the time of Edward the Confessor, or, at least, of William the Conqueror. But in truth the writer, whoever he was, is more modest; for the very title states it to be no more than a description of the mode of proceeding in Parliament used "not only by the founder of the Norman line," but "of his successors, Kings of England." And he does not profess to tell where he discovered, or whence he derived his original document, neither, indeed, does he distinctly assert, that he had any such before him. Sir Robert Cotton, no mean judge, calls it a "reverend monument not far from that grave man (Glanville's) time," or the reign of Henry the Second. The learned Selden in his *Titles of Honour* says, that he had seen divers copies of it, but never any which exceeded the age of Edward the Third, to which period he attributes it. Prynne, however, brings it still lower. He supposes it to have been drawn up towards the end of Henry the Sixth.—But not to trouble you or your readers with a discussion to settle the fact, the very latest date is old

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enough to satisfy any reasonable inquirer, if otherwise the treatise is of any authority. Now, Sir Robert Cotton quotes it without scruple; Selden admits, "divers things in that *Modus* (and among them some that differ much from the present and later ages) to have been agreeable to the ancient Parliaments;" and the proof which Prynne offers, consists in a great measure of references to parliamentary records in the time of Richard the Second, and the three Princes of the House of Lancaster, whence he supposes some portion of the materials to have been drawn.—The passage in question Mr. Justice Doddridge appears to have taken from the fourteenth section of the *Modus*. Now this is one of the passages which Prynne selects as founded upon our Parliamentary History in the time of Richard the Second; and it is the very part which Sir Robert Cotton quotes in his argument, "that the Sovereign's person is required in the great councils." He adduces the original words:—"Rex tenetur omni modo personaliter interesse Parlamento, nisi per corporalem ægritudinem detineatur." THEN (adds he, abstracting the sense still more shortly than Mr. Justice Doddridge) TO ACQUAINT THE PARLIAMENT OF EITHER HOUSE OF SUCH OCCASION. And he subjoins the reason assigned for this, to wit, because there used to be a murmur and an outcry (we have certainly better-behaved Parliaments now) about the King's absence, as mischievous and dangerous to the whole commonalty of Parliament and the realm:—"Causa est, quod solebat CLAMOR ET MURMUR esse pro absentia Regis, quia res damnosa et periculosa est toti communitati Parliamenti et Regni, cum Rex a Parlamento absens fuerit."—Your readers, Mr. Cobbett, will probably be tired by this time of this dry subject; and I have now fully answered your correspondent. But I can assure him and them, that many more, and the gravest authorities, could, if necessary, be accumulated, to shew with what jealousy our ancestors watched over every interruption to the *personal* intercourse between the King and his Parliament. *The very twelve persons have been actually sent to satisfy the House of the cause of the King's absence, when he was prevented by sickness from meeting his Parliament.* Happily, however, we are now assured by the public papers of his Majesty's perfect recovery, and it is impossible to doubt the fact, since six weeks ago we gave solemn thanks in all our temples on this joyful occasion.—I am, &c. &c.—T. M.—*Middle Temple, July 3, 1804.*

BANK DOLLAR BILL.

SIR,—It is reported, that, in the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the 2d instant, on the bill to prevent the counterfeiting Bank dollars, Mr. Pitt declared, that these dollars were to be issued merely as *tokens*, without any reference at all to their intrinsic value. It does not appear that any observation was made on this assertion of that gentleman. It seems to me, however, to be so extraordinary an one, that it has induced me to trouble you with a few words upon the subject.—If the assertion alluded to was actually made, I should be glad to inquire, if Mr. Pitt believes, or thinks that he can make other persons believe, it to be the fact, that these dollars so issued by the Bank can be made to bear *any* value, which the Bank chooses to affix to them. "They are to be considered," says he, "merely as tokens, as *silver notes*." Are they so? A paper note, which is intrinsically worth nothing at all, can be made to be worth 1 pound, or 10 pounds, or 500 pounds, according to the mark which is affixed to it; and if the dollars are merely silver notes, they must be capable, at the will of the Bank, to assume different values in the same way. But is this the case? Does Mr. Pitt think, that if the Bank was to put an advertisement in the paper, saying they were issued at 5l. and would be taken again at that price, does he think they would be current as 5 l. notes? Does he think they could be made to pass as 1 l. notes? Nay, does he think, that they could pass as 5s. 6d. notes? Most assuredly they could not at present. They are intrinsically worth about 5 shillings, according to the present state of the paper, as 5 shillings they will be taken, but not at one farthing more; which is, I think, pretty good proof that they have a reference to their intrinsic value, and that they are not merely tokens or silver notes. It appears to me, Mr. Cobbett, pretty plain, why these dollars are to be wrapped up in this bill of mystery, and are to be issued in this doubtful character; nobody knowing whether they are to be looked upon as coin or as notes. That they are not merely notes, I have already shown; that they are not the King's coin is apparent; for though they bear the King's image on the one side, on the other they are impressed with the arms of the Bank. The reason is this: the dollar in sterling money, is worth only 4s. 6d. at most, its present current value is 5s. or thereabouts? Is the dollar risen in value? No: then the other alternative of necessity must be confessed,

that the 4s. 6d. have sunk. This, as you have before observed, amounts to absolute proof of the depreciation of our money. The dollars thus issued then, if looked upon as coin, would contain that proof, and if they are issued as a coin of 5s. that is, as worth 5s. sterling, a fraud would be committed on the public; they would then be forced to be taken in exchange for crown pieces, which contain 6d. more silver than they do. Again, if 5s. notes had been issued by the Bank, then came all the objections to such small notes, and we should be exposed to all the calamities under which Ireland is now groaning in consequence of her issues of silver notes. How then are the two rocks to be avoided, and how is that done? It is done by giving to the dollars this double doubtful character; by issuing them as notes; and letting them assume the appearance of coin and pass as such. Do you object to silver notes? You are immediately shown the King's head on the dollar; and asked whether that is not something more than a note. Do you assert that they are issued for more than their sterling value, and that a fraud is thus committed? The reverse is then presented to you, and you see the arms of the Bank, with the inscription "Bank Dollar;" and you are then told, this is no coin; it is merely a token note; only a silver note instead of a paper one. If so, why was not paper used? If paper was bad, why was not lead or tin? Such notes would have been cheaper to the Bank, and full as convenient for the public.—I have run on with greater length than I intended. I will not therefore stop now to compare the above assertion of Mr. Pitt, with the fact, as is demonstrated in the different denomination of the value of the dollars in England and Ireland? The dollar, which is called Dollar in England, is worth 5s. In Ireland it is called a Token, and passes for 6s. (5s. 6d. English money) and after that Mr. Pitt gravely tells the House of Commons, "these dollars are mere tokens, they are silver notes, their intrinsic value is nothing to the purpose." Leaving you and your readers to reconcile these differences if they are able. I remain, Sir, your, &c. ANNIBAL.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Note from Francis Drake, Esq. English Minister at Munich to Baron de Montgelas, the Bavarian Minister of State, dated Munich, 30th of March, 1804.

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary from his Britannic Majesty, has been informed, that his Electoral Highness has been

pleased, at the requisition of the French Government, to give a hint to all noblemen, who quitted France during the revolution, and may now be found in his dominions, to leave the same within 10 days, without excepting those who are dependent on the British government. Although this account appears to be tolerably authentic, the undersigned cannot give any credit to it, without receiving a confirmation thereof from his Excellency Baron Montgelas, as he is too well convinced of the just and generous sentiments of his Electoral Highness, to believe that his Highness could have consented to such a demand from a power, which has formally declared, by the 4th article of its own constitution, that there are not any relations left existing between it and the persons against whom that measure is supposed to be taken: this deprives it of the right to assume any authority with respect to them; a principle which your Excellency owned yourself, at a time when it was in agitation to prohibit in this country the decorations of the French monarchy. The undersigned is the more justified in his supposition, that he must have been misinformed on this subject, as knowing how sorely the feeling heart of his Electoral Highness must be afflicted, if obliged to exercise any rigour towards persons, against whom no cause of reproach can be alleged; unless it be a reproach, that they have shewn themselves so firmly devoted to their duties, and to that sovereign house with which his Electoral Highness formerly stood connected, in so many respects.—The undersigned is moreover convinced, that it could not escape the enlightened wisdom of his Electoral Highness, that a similar exercise of rigour, against those respectable, and already so very unfortunate persons, would form a rueful example of the fate awaiting those who, in a moment of danger, are inclined to remain true to their lawful Sovereign; and which example may induce them to swerve from their duty at the very moment when a Sovereign stands most in need of the efforts and actual proofs of their attachment.—The undersigned has, therefore, the honour to request Baron Von Montgelas to clear up his doubts on this subject, and to inform him, whether the measure in question will extend to the officers of the late Condean army, who are attached to the British government, that he may be enabled to acquaint his Court thereof, and to await the commands of his Sovereign accordingly.—The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to request Baron Von Montgelas to accept the assurances of his most particular regard, &c.

Note from the same to the same. dated, Munich, 31st of March, 1804.

I have just received a notice of so very extraordinary a nature, but which is so important of itself, and for the consequences which may result from it, that though I am very far from crediting it, I think it a duty I owe to my Sovereign, to whom my person and services belong, as well as to his highness the Elector himself, immediately to inform your Excellency thereof. The said notice is in substance to the following purport: that a seizure of the British ministry at Munich is in agitation, in the manner of that which took place with respect to his highness the Duke of Enghien, at Ettenheim, in the territory of the Elector of Baden, but with this difference, that the second seizure will not be effected by a body of troops, but by men secretly sent to Munich, and its neighbourhood, by different roads. With respect to the moment and particulars of the execution, I have no detailed accounts; and I own to your Excellency, that the difficulties of the enterprize appeared to me from the first too great, the project itself too extravagant, and at the same time too dreadful, to be fully convinced of its existence: on the other hand, it cannot be concealed, that the example of events which have very recently occurred, as it were, under our eyes, are little calculated to inspire confidence. However this may be, and little as this notice has affected me personally, yet it appears to me, that I should be transgressing the duties which my post, as a public minister, require, if I neglected informing your Excellency thereof forthwith, that you may be enabled to take in time such measures as the case may require, and to avert, by proper acts of precaution, the unpleasant result which might arise, even from the attempt to execute a design of this nature. I beg your Excellency to accept the assurance, &c.

Note presented to the French Min. of Foreign Affairs, by the Russian Chargé d'Affairs, MR. OUBRIEL; relative to the Occurrences at Ettenheim, where the Duke D'Enghien was seized. Dated Paris, April 20, 1804.

According to the orders which the undersigned Chargé d'Affairs of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has received from his Court, he hastens to inform the Minister of the French Republic, that his illustrious Master has learned, with equal astonishment and concern, the event that has taken place at Ettenheim, the circumstances that have attended it, and its melancholy result. The concern of the Em-

peror on this occasion is the more lively as he can by no means reconcile the violation of the territory of the Elector of Baden to those principles of justice and propriety which are held sacred among nations, and are the bulwark of their reciprocal relations. His Imperial Majesty finds in this act a violation of the rights of nations, and of a neutral territory, which, at least, was as arbitrary as it was public; a violation, the consequences of which are difficult to estimate, and which, if considered as admissible, must entirely annihilate the security and independence of sovereign states. If the German Empire, after the misfortunes it has suffered, which have made it sensibly feel the necessity of tranquillity and repose, must still be in fear for the integrity of its territory, could it have been expected that this should have originated on the part of a government which has laboured to secure to it peace, and imposed on itself the duty of guaranteeing its continuance. All these considerations have not permitted the Emperor to pass over in silence this unexpected event, which has spread consternation through all Germany.—His Imperial Majesty has held it to be his duty, as guarantee and mediator of the peace, to notify to the States of the Empire, the manner in which he views an action which endangers their security and independence. The Russian Resident at Ratisbon has, in consequence received orders to deliver in a note to the Diet, and to represent to it, and to the Head of the Empire, the necessity of remonstrating to the French Government against this violation of the German territory.—His Imperial Majesty holds it in like manner to be his duty to notify his sentiments directly to the French Government, by the undersigned, as his Majesty is assured, that the First Consul will hasten to attend to the just remonstrances of the German political body, and feel the pressing necessity of taking the most active measures to relieve all the Governments of Europe from the alarm he must have occasioned to them, and put an end to an order of things too dangerous to their safety and future independence.—The undersigned hereby fulfils the commands of his illustrious Master, and avails himself of this opportunity to communicate to the Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs, the assurance of his high esteem.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Translation of an Imperial Ukase, issued by the Emperor of Russia at St. Petersburg, the 7th of May, 1804, relative to the Admission of Foreigners into his Imperial Ma-

jesty's Dominions. Signed by the EMPEROR, and countersigned by COUNT V. Kotchubey.

I. To enter our frontiers all persons, except in the undermentioned cases, are to be provided with passports from our ministers or other agents residing in foreign countries. Particular instructions will be sent to our ministers and consuls as to the manner in which such passports are to be granted, so as to cause the least inconvenience to trade or general intercourse.—II. Persons coming from cities or places where we have neither missions nor consuls, must produce passports at the frontiers from the governors or chief officers there. Passports from inferior officers, from country justices or commissioners, or from the magistrates, will not be acknowledged. The governors of our frontier provinces will receive instructions in what manner they are to communicate with the governors of provinces belonging to another power relative to this point, and directions will be given at the barriers where passports are to be acknowledged.—III. Russian subjects, traders, and other persons usually residing in Russia, having passports to go abroad for a limited term, will be permitted to return with the same passport.—IV. Persons owing allegiance to two powers (*sujets mixtes*) must, from our side, be provided with a passport for a year from the regency of that government in which their property lies, with which, during that term, they may pass out and in without interruption.—V. All persons must produce their passports at the frontiers; and, if conformable to these regulations, they will be allowed to pass without molestation, except such as may be particularly ordered to be stopped.—VI. These regulations are to extend to all sea ports, in so far as regards passengers arriving there. Ship masters and persons serving on board of ships, are to be admitted upon the former existing regulations.—VII. All these regulations shall be enforced for the nearer parts of Europe within two months; and for the more distant, namely, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, within four months, reckoning from the date of this ordinance (*Ukase*) which shall be published in the newspapers of both our capitals.—VIII. The daily communications of persons residing on the frontiers will remain on the former footing.—IX. The intercourse with various Asiatic nations on the frontiers of the Cuban, on the lines of the Caucasus and Orenburg, and also with the Turkish subjects in general, is to remain on the former

footing.—X. Passports will be granted to persons going out of the country as formerly.

Orders issued by Dessalines, as Governor General of St. Domingo, dated April 9, 1804.

All proprietors that have produce to sell shall previously pay a fourth part as a territorial imposition. The power of selling produce of the 11th year shall only belong to proprietors who belonged to the indigenous army in the 11th year. Persons who since that period have resided with the French are not to have the benefit of that year's produce; their property being confiscated for the use of the indigenous army. Mules, horses, and other animals belonging to the habitations sequestered, are to be given up to the administrators of domains, who are to give an account of the same to the general commanding the department, who will place them in the most advantageous manner on the sequestered estates, to be employed in cultivation. It is expressly forbidden, that any officer shall intermeddle with the cultivation of the estates. All sugar manufactories previously given to chief of corps, shall be returned to the administrators of domains. All proprietors resident with the French to the time of the Indigenous army taking possession of a place, shall forfeit all the produce of their estates during the 11th year. The generals commanding departments shall cause generals of brigade to execute the fortifications ordered to be erected in the high mountains of the interior; and the generals of brigade shall from time to time make reports of their proceedings, and their works. All sales, or gifts of moveables or immoveables, made by emigrants, in favour of persons residing in the island, are annulled; it being understood when so made after the indigenous army had taken up arms to expel the French from Hayti.

✍ The Summary of Politics is unavoidably deferred till the next sheet.—This being the first Number of Vol. VI. of the Register, it may not be unnecessary to acquaint those gentlemen who happen to be deficient in the sheets of the preceding volume, that there are but very few of the sheets of that volume remaining, and that, unless they apply to the publisher without delay, it will be quite impossible for them ever to complete their volumes.—N. B. Sets of the Register, or any particular volume, may be had by applying to any of the Newsmen, or Booksellers.